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All current approaches to quantum gravity employ essentially standard quan-
tum theory including, in particular, continuum quantities such as the real or
complex numbers. However, I wish to argue that this may be fundamentally
wrong in so far as the use of these continuum quantities in standard quan-
tum theory can be traced back to certain a priori assumptions about the
nature of space and time: assumptions that may be incompatible with the
view of space and time adopted by a quantum gravity theory. My conjecture
is that in, some yet to be determined sense, to each type of space-time there
is associated a corresponding type of quantum theory in which continuum
quantities do not necessarily appear, being replaced with structures that are
appropriate to the specific space-time.
Topos theory then arises as a possible tool for ‘gluing’ together these
different theories associated with the different space-times. As a concrete ex-
ample of the use of topos ideas, I summarise recent work applying presheaf
theory to the Kochen-Specher theorem and the assignment of values to phys-
ical quantities in a quantum theory.
1email: c.isham@ic.ac.uk
1 Introduction
The period in the late 1960’s when I was a postgraduate student at Imperial
College saw rapid changes in theoretical physics in response to data streaming
from the world’s particle accelerators. One consequence was that the subject
matter of a student’s PhD thesis sometimes changed uncomfortably rapidly
during the course of his or her studies. As a result, there was a tendency
for supervisors to assign a provisional thesis title like “Topics in elementary
particle physics”—a practice that was understandable, but which was finally
blocked by the University of London some years ago!
When asked to speak at this Symposium in honour of Stephen Hawking,
I adopted a similar tactic by choosing as the provisional title “Prima facie
questions in quantum gravity”, on the grounds that this would give maximum
flexibility when it came to actually write the talk. However, in the event, I
have chosen to focus on one single issue, and the title of my lecture has been
readjusted accordingly.
The question I wish to address is the extent to which ideas of standard
quantum theory are adequate for the formulation of a quantum theory of
gravity: in particular, in regard to (i) the use of continuum quantities in
the mathematical foundations of quantum theory; and (ii) possible roles for
topos theory. In this context it should be emphasised that all the current
mainstream approaches to quantum gravity use standard quantum theory in
one form or another.
Of course, it is well understood that, at a conceptual level, the standard
interpretation of quantum theory is inadequate when, for example, applied to
quantum cosmology. Specifically, the lack of any external observer of the uni-
verse ‘as a whole’ throws into doubt the instrumentalism of the Copenhagen
interpretation; as does any attempt to construct a quantum gravity theory
with no background space-time in which an ‘observer’ could be placed. The
extent to which such reservations apply to quantum gravity away from the
cosmological regime is still debated, but in practice most work on quantum
gravity pays only lip service to these conceptual issues.
However, what I have in mind are not conceptual issues per se but rather
certainmathematical ingredients in the formalism of quantum theory that are
invariably taken for granted and yet which, I claim, implicitly assume certain
properties of space and time that may be fundamentally incompatible with
the spatio-temporal concepts needed for a successful quantum gravity theory.
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An example of particular interest is the use of the continuum (via the real
or complex numbers).
More generally, one can question the almost universal assumption that
spatio-temporal concepts are to be implemented mathematically using stan-
dard point-set theory: this notwithstanding the frequently-voiced objection
that the literal idea of a space, or time, point is physically meaningless. In
fact, there exists something—namely topos theory—that can replace set the-
ory as the foundation of mathematics, and which could arguably be a more
appropriate way of modelling spatio-temporal concepts in physical regimes
where quantum gravity effects are paramount. As we shall see, topos theory
is also relevant to questions concerning the status of the continuum. These
considerations have motivated my focussing the lecture on two main areas:
(i) the a priori status of spatio-temporal concepts in quantum theory, par-
ticularly in regard to the use of continua; and (ii) certain possible roles for
topos theory in theoretical physics.
Considerations of this type are part of the general question of the role
of standard spatio-temporal concepts in a theory of quantum gravity. In
the current major quantum gravity programmes, most of these concepts are
inserted by hand as part of the overall background structure of the theory.
On the other hand, there is a school of thought that maintains that the
standard ideas of space and time should ‘emerge’ from the theory only in
some appropriate limit or physical regime; in which case, a crucial question
is whether the theory contains any fundamental concepts/structures that
can be be broadly identified as ‘spatio-temporal’, or if all such concepts or
structures are emergent in some way. One of the attractions of the consistent-
histories approach to quantum theory (of which more later) is that it allows
for the idea of emergent structures in a natural way via the process of coarse-
graining: analogous to how thermodynamical concepts arise from statistical
physics when microscopic details of the system are ignored.
En passent , one might ask what else could arise from the fundamental
theory in some appropriate physical limit. This might include the entire
mathematical formalism of standard quantum theory, including its use of
Hilbert spaces defined over IR or |C. Perhaps the conceptual structure of
standard quantum theory is also an emergent structure: in particular, the
special role for measurement, and the use of probabilities that lie in the
closed interval [0, 1] of the real numbers. Certainly, there is no compelling
logical reason why whatever plays the role of standard quantum theory at
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the Planck length—if, indeed, there is any such theory—should possess all
the features of the theory that is known to work empirically only at atomic
and nuclear scales.
However, one of the key questions of interest in the present paper is not
how the standard ideas of space and time (and probability) might emerge
from a different formalism; but rather how one might proceed to construct
a quantum theory ab initio in which whatever fundamental spatio-temporal
concepts are present are definitely not the familiar continuum ones: for ex-
ample, if one is given a finite causal set as a background structure. The first
step, and the only one taken in the present paper, is to sound a cautionary
note by emphasising how strongly the continuum ideas of space and time are
implicitly embedded in the standard formulation of quantum theory.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 there is a discussion of
the role of continuum concepts in the formulation of quantum theory in the
presence of a non-standard background (such as a causal set [2] [3]). The
conclusion of the discussion is that, in some appropriate sense, there may be
a different type of quantum theory for each type of background space-time.
If this is indeed the case, the question then arises as to how these different
theories are to be ‘patched’ together in a true quantum gravity theory in
which these backgrounds are themselves subject to quantum effects. One
possibility is the use of topos theory. In Section 3 we discuss other ways
in which the standard notion of space-time may change and, again, find a
possible role for topos theory.
Since topos theory is an important mathematical ingredient in our con-
siderations, one part of the subject—the theory of presheaves—is introduced
in Section 4. It is then shown in Section 5 how this can be used in a nat-
ural way to illustrate certain key features (specifically the Kochen-Specker
theorem) of standard quantum theory. The main physical idea here is a role
for contextual, multi-valued logic—an idea that in itself has many possible
fruitful applications in theoretical physics.
2 The Danger of A Priori Assumptions
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2.1 The use of the real and complex numbers in quan-
tum theory
The use of the real and complex numbers is a basic feature of all approaches
to quantum theory: Hilbert spaces of states, C∗-algebras of observables,
quantum logic of propositions, functional integral methods, etc., etc. These
number systems have a variety of relevant mathematical properties, but the
one of particular interest here is that they are continuua, by which—in the
present context—is meant not only that IR and |C have the appropriate car-
dinality, but also that they come equipped with the familiar topology and
differential structure that makes them manifolds of real dimension one and
two respectively.
My concern is that the use of these numbers may be problematic in the
context of a quantum gravity theory whose underlying notion of space and
time is different from that of a smooth manifold. The danger is that by
imposing a continuum structure in the quantum theory a priori , one may
be creating a theoretical system that is fundamentally unsuitable for the
incorporation of spatio-temporal concepts of a non-continuum nature: this
would be the theoretical-physics analogue of what a philosopher might call
a ‘category error’. For this reason, it is important to consider carefully the
origin, and role, in standard quantum theory of this particular facet of the
real (and complex) numbers.
In general terms, the real numbers arise in three ways in physical theories:
(i) as the values of physical quantities; (ii) to model space and time; and (iii)
as the values of probabilities. Our present task is to consider more precisely
the use real numbers in quantum theory in these terms.
As a first step, consider the simple example with which most undergradu-
ate courses on quantum theory begin: a non-relativistic point particle moving
in one dimension. The state of the system at a time t is represented by a wave
function ψt(x), and we see at once that continuum quantities are involved in
three ways: (i) as the argument x in the wave function; (ii) as the value of
the wave function; and (iii) as the time parameter t. Let us consider these
in turn.
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2.1.1 The x in ψ(x)
From one perspective, the x in ψ(x) arises because we are starting with a
classical theory and then ‘quantising’ it. In the present example, the classical
configuration space Q is identified with the real line because the system is a
point particle moving in (one-dimensional) physical space, and the latter is
modelled by the real numbers.
In general, the configuration space (if there is one) Q for a classical system
is modelled mathematically by a differentiable manifold, and the classical
state space is the co-tangent bundle T ∗Q. The physical motivation for using
a manifold to represent Q again reduces to the fact that we represent physical
space with a manifold. This is clearly so for configurations that correspond
to the position of the centre-of-mass of an object in space, or its overall
orientation in space, but it also applies to internal degrees of freedom of
relative positions of constituent entities.
Thus, in assuming that the state space of a classical system is a manifold
of the form T ∗Q we are importing into the classical theory a powerful a priori
picture of physical space: namely, that it is a differentiable manifold2. This
then carries across to the corresponding quantum theory. For example, if
‘quantisation’ is construed to mean defining the quantum states to be cross-
sections of some flat3 vector bundle over Q, then the domain of these state
functions is the continuum space Q.
However, for this argument to have any force we need to consider why
quantisation is so defined, and this takes us to the issue of the space in which
the wave function has its values.
2.1.2 The value of the function ψ(x)—the role of classical physical
quantities.
In the example of the quantum theory of a particle moving in one-dimension,
the value of the state function ψ(x) is a complex number: so, once again,
2There may be cases where S is a symplectic manifold that is not a cotangent bundle; for
example, S := S2. However, I would argue that the reason S is assumed to be a manifold
is still ultimately grounded in an a priori assumption about the nature of physical space
(and time).
3The bundle is chosen to be flat so that a covariant derivative of sections can be defined
without the need to introduce extra local ‘connection’ variables into the theory.
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a continuum concept arises. This particular one comes from two different
sources.
On the one hand, the operator xˆ that represents the position of the par-
ticle acts on the state function as
(xˆψ)(x) := xψ(x). (1)
More generally, for a system with a configuration manifold Q, a classical
physical configuration quantity corresponds to a real-valued function f : Q→
IR, and this function is represented in the quantum theory by the operator
(fˆψ)(q) := f(q)ψ(q). (2)
on sections of the appropriate vector bundle.
Although this equation does not prove that ψ(q) is |C-valued, it does show
that, for each q ∈ Q, the space in which ψ(q) takes its values must be such
that it admits a multiplication operation by real numbers.
We see that this particular sources of the real numbers in quantum theory
comes from the assumption that classical physical quantities are real-valued,
which is then translated into an analogous requirement on the quantum vari-
ables.
A related feature is that in any quantum system the eigenvector equation
for a physical quantity A is of the form Aˆ|a〉 = a|a〉, where a is a real number.
So the state space has to be such that its elements can be multiplied by real
numbers. Note that this applies even to quantum physical quantities that
have no classical analogue: we still assume that their eigenvalues are real
numbers. Of course, for many quantities the set of all eigenvalues will be a
discrete subset of IR, but that does not detract from the point being made
here.
It is thus pertinent to ask why physical quantities—classical or quantum—
are taken to be real-valued. Many will doubtless say that the answer is
obvious, or that it is even part of the definition of a physical quantity, but I
would challenge these assertions as being over-hasty.
One reason why the values of physical quantities are assumed to be real
numbers is undoubtedly the operational one that—at least, in the pre-digital
age—physical quantities are ultimately measured with rulers and pointers,
and so it is the assumed continuum nature of physical space that comes into
play.
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However, it is by no means obvious that physical quantities should nec-
essarily be real-valued in, for example, a quantum gravity theory in which
it is not appropriate to think of space as a smooth manifold, and where,
therefore, there is no place for operational considerations that presuppose a
continuum nature for space and/or time.
Of course, it is a totally open question as to what should replace IR as
the value space of a physical quantity in these circumstances—it could be
something as obvious as a finite number field, but it could also be something
far more radical. In any event, a key role in deciding this issue should be
played by any underlying spatio-temporal concepts (albeit, non-standard)
that are present.
2.1.3 The value of the function ψ(x) —the role of probability.
A different source of the |C-valued nature of the wave-function is its probabilis-
tic interpretation. Of course, this extends outside simple wave mechanics,
with the general quantum-theory result that if Eˆ(A ∈ ∆) is the spectral
projector onto the eigenspace of Aˆ with eigenvalues in the (Borel) set ∆ ⊂ IR
then, if the (normalised) state is ψ, the probability that the proposition “The
physical quantity A lies in ∆” is true is4
Prob(A ∈ ∆;ψ) = 〈ψ, Eˆ(A ∈ ∆)〉. (3)
From our present perspective, the key point is that the assumption that
probabilities should lie in the interval [0, 1] of the real numbers requires the
field over which the Hilbert state space is defined to be such as to accommo-
date this assumption via the right hand side of Eq. (3). So this is yet another
source of the use of continuum quantities in the mathematical formulation
of quantum theory.
In the context of standard physics, it is clear why probabilities are re-
quired to lie in the interval [0, 1]. As physicists, we most commonly employ
a relative-frequency interpretation of probability in which an experiment is
repeated a large number, say N , times, and the probability associated with a
particular result is then defined to be the ratio Ni/N , where Ni is the num-
ber of experiments in which that result was obtained. The rational numbers
4Of course, in the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory it would
be more appropriate to say that the proposition represented by the spectral projector
Eˆ(A ∈ ∆) is “If a measurement is made of A, then the value will be found to lie in ∆.
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Ni/N necessarily lie between 0 and 1, and if we take the limit as N → ∞,
as is appropriate for a hypothetical ‘infinite ensemble’, we get real numbers
in the closed interval [0, 1].
Although the relative-frequency interpretation of probability may seem
natural in standard physics, it is not meaningful in situations where there
is no classical spatio-temporal background in which observations could be
made; or, if there is a background, it is such that there is no meaningful ana-
logue of the relative-frequencies interpretation adapted to that background.
Under such circumstances it might be more natural to follow Aristotle,
Heisenberg and Popper in adopting a propensity interpretation of probability,
perhaps within the context of a ‘post-Everett’ form of quantum theory, such
as consistent-histories theory.
However, if probability is viewed in this more realist way, there is no
overwhelming reason for assigning its values to be real numbers lying in the
interval [0, 1]. The minimal requirement is presumably only that the value
space should be a partially ordered set (V,≤) so that it makes sense to say
that certain events are more, or less, probable (in the sense of the partial-
ordering operation ≤) than others.
Note that this allows for the possibility of pairs of events whose propen-
sities are incomparable: i.e., the probability value-space V may not be a
totally-ordered set. We would, however, expect there to be a unit element
1 ∈ V, corresponding to the probability of an event that is certain to happen
(or the proposition that is identically true), and with p ≤ 1 for all p ∈ V.
Similarly, there should be a null element 0 ∈ V, corresponding to the prob-
ability of an event that is certain not to happen (or the proposition that is
identically false), and with 0 ≤ p for all p ∈ V.
It also seems natural to require that V has some ‘semi-additive’ structure
so that the probability of two disjoint events is the ‘sum’ of the probabilities
of the individual events. At the very least, if P is any proposition and ¬P
is its negation, we would expect the probability of P ∨ ¬P to be the unit5
1 ∈ P, and equal to the ‘sum’ of the probabilities of P and ¬P .
Of course, it is an open question as to what precise mathematical struc-
ture should be used as the value-space for probabilities in the absence of any
classical spatio-temporal background; or, indeed, what it should be in the
5This would not be so if for some reason the quantum propositions obeyed an intuition-
istic logic (see later) where the principle of excluded middle does not necessarily apply.
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presence of a non-standard background such as a causal set. But the key
point is that there is no fundamental reason why this value-space has to in-
volve the real numbers; and the form of quantum theory in such a situation
should reflect this fact.
2.1.4 The t in ψt(x)
The time-parameter t in the wave-function is taken directly from the cor-
responding parameter in classical, non-relativistic physics. It is Newtonian
time, and as such it is part of the background structure of standard Newto-
nian physics. It is represented by a real number: indeed, the full manifold
structure of IR (and of the classical state space) is invoked when defining the
differential equations of motion of classical physics.
In relativistic physics, space and time are placed on a more equal footing,
with a background space-time manifold rather just a background time. In
special relativity, this background manifold has the topological and differen-
tial structure of IR4, and is equipped with the, fixed, Minkowskian metric
tensor.
Things change considerably when we come to the space and time of gen-
eral relativity: indeed in the context of quantum gravity, time is a difficult
concept—in particular, there is the well-known ‘problem of time’ that affects
all approaches to quantum gravity in one way or another.
This problem was first explicitly encountered in the context of the canon-
ical approach to quantum gravity, whose central feature is the constraint
equations on the state vector Ψ
Hˆi(x)Ψ = 0 (4)
Hˆ⊥(x)Ψ = 0 (5)
where Hi and H⊥ are constructed from the metric tensor g (and its conjugate
variable) on an underlying 3-manifold [4] [5].
Equation (4) simply asserts the invariance of Ψ under (small) spatial dif-
feomorphisms. However, equation (5) is more problematic. In the represen-
tation in which Ψ appears as a functional Ψ[g], eq. (5) is the Wheeler-DeWitt
equation, and—in one approach to the ‘problem of time’—is interpreted as a
dynamical equation with respect to an ‘internal’ time variable that has to be
constructed from the metric tensor and its conjugate. It is always assumed
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that this variable will be represented by a real number: indeed, the inter-
nal time is usually sought from the perspective of classical canonical general
relativity—which is bound to lead to a real quantity. So once again we see
how a priori assumptions about the nature of time can be placed into the
quantum theory from the outset. (Of course, the canonical approach already
comes with an explicit background spatial manifold.)
2.2 Space-time dependent quantum theory
The main conclusion I wish to draw from the discussion above is that a num-
ber of a priori assumptions about the nature of space and time are present in
the mathematical formalism of standard quantum theory, and it may there-
fore be necessary to seek a major restructuring of this formalism in situations
where the underlying spatio-temporal concepts (if there are any at all) are
different from the standard ones which are represented mathematically with
the aid of differential geometry.
A good example would be to consider from scratch how to construct a
quantum theory when space-time is a finite causal set: either a single such—
which then forms a fixed, but non-standard, spatio-temporal background—
or else a collection of such sets in the context of a type of quantum gravity
theory. In the case of a fixed background, this new quantum formalism should
be adapted to the precise structure of the background, and can be expected
to involve a substantial departure from the standard formalism: particularly
in regard to the use of real numbers as the values of physical quantities and
probabilities.
The fundamental emphasis in a causal set is on a space-time structure as a
single unit, rather than separate space and time structures, and this suggests
strongly that it would be better to start ab initio with a history theory rather
than one in which some type of ‘temporal slicing’ is introduced. It should be
emphasised that the path-integral approach to standard quantum theory is
not a history theory in the way the phrase is being used here. Indeed, a path
integral generates transition amplitudes between canonical states, which im-
plicitly requires some type of time slicing. In fact, the only genuine ‘history’
theory I know that can handle space-time stuctures as integral entities is the
consistent-histories formalism of Griffiths [6], Omnes [7] and Gell-Mann and
Hartle [8].
Thus an instructive research programme would be to develop a version
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of consistent-history quantum theory that is appropriate for a background
causal set. In this context, a particularly useful approach could be the Gell-
Mann and Hartle method as axiomatised in the language of quantum tem-
poral logic by Isham [9], and Isham and Linden [10], together with the com-
pletely new perspective on the role of time introduced by Savvidou [16]. Here
one has an orthoalgebra UP of propositions about the history of the system,
and a space D of ‘decoherence functions’ that are maps d : UP × UP → |C
and which encode both the dynamics and the initial conditions. From a
physical perspective, if a proposition α ∈ UP belongs to a consistent set,
then d(α, α) is interpreted as the probability that α is true in the context of
that consistent set.
It follows from the discussion above, that if there is a background causal
set the quantum history formalism should be such that this structure is
reflected in (i) the choice of the space UP of propositions about the ‘uni-
verse’; and (ii) the choice of the space in which decoherence functions take
their values, with an associated change in the mathematical representation
of probability.
Finally, if it is indeed the case that, in some sense, to each background
space-time there is associated a corresponding type of quantum theory, then
the question arises as to how these different theories can be ‘patched’ together
to give a quantum space-time theory in which the different backgrounds are
themselves the subject of quantum effects. One possibility is the use of topos
theory: in particular, the theory of presheaves which provides a powerful
way of handling situations where there is a space of ‘contexts’ with respect
to which individual structures are associated. For example, a context could
be a causal set.
Topos theory is of potential interest in theoretical physics in a number
of ways, and it will recur in much of what follows. For this reason, an
introduction to some of the basic ideas in given in Section 4.
3 Alternative Conceptions of Spacetime
3.1 Points or Regions?
Doubts about the use of the continuum in present-day physical theories
prompts one to consider more general alternative conceptions of space and
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time. We turn now to briefly sketch two such, both of which involve topos
theory, and which raise the even more iconoclastic idea that the use of set the-
ory itself may be inappropriate for modelling space and time in the context
of quantum gravity.
3.1.1 From points to regions
In standard general relativity—and, indeed, in all classical physics—space
(and similarly time) is modelled by a set, and the elements of that set cor-
respond to points in space. However, it is often claimed that the notion of a
spatial (or temporal) point has no real physical meaning, and this motivates
trying to construct a theory in which ‘regions’ are the primary concept. In
such a theory,‘points’—if they exist at all—would play a secondary role in
which they are determined in some way by the regions (rather than regions
being collections of points, as in standard set theory).
In fact, there are axiom systems for regions, some of whose models do not
contain anything corresponding to points of which the regions are composed.
As an example, consider a topological space X . The family of all open
sets has the algebraic operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation
defined by O1 ∧ O2 := O1 ∩ O2; O1 ∨ O2 := O1 ∪ O2; and ¬O := int(X −
O) respectively; and with these operations, the open sets form a complete
Heyting algebra, also known as a locale. Here, a Heyting algebra H is defined
to be a distributive lattice, with null and unit elements, that is relatively
complemented , which means that to any pair S1, S2 in H , there exists an
element S1 ⇒ S2 of H with the property that, for all S ∈ H , we have
S ≤ (S1 ⇒ S2) if and only if S ∧ S1 ≤ S2.
Heyting algebras are thus a generalization of Boolean algebras. In partic-
ular, they need not obey the law of excluded middle, and so provide natural
algebraic structures for intuitionistic logic. A Heyting algebra is said to be
complete if every family of elements has a least upper bound. Thus, when
partially ordered by set-inclusion, the open sets of any topological space form
a Heyting algebra. This algebra is complete since arbitrary unions of open
sets are open, and the disjunction of an arbitrary family of open sets can be
defined as the interior of their intersection.
However, it transpires that not every locale is isomorphic to the Heyting
algebra of open sets of some topological space; and in this sense, the theory
of regions given by the definition of a locale is a generalisation of the idea of
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a topological space that allows regions that are not composed of underlying
points. This might be an interesting alternative to standard topology for
modelling space-time in the context of quantum gravity.
A far-reaching generalisation of this idea is given by topos theory. As we
shall see in Section 4, in any topos the idea of a ‘subobject’ is the analogue
of the set-theoretic notion of a subset of a given set; and for any object X
in a topos, the family of subobjects of X is a Heyting algebra, and hence
another possible model for the regions of space-time.
3.2 Synthetic Differential Geometry
Recent decades have seen a revival of the idea of infinitesimals: nilpotent
real numbers d such that d2 = 0. At first sight this seems nonsensical (apart
from the trivial case d = 0) but it turns out that sense can be made of this,
and in two different ways.
In the first approach, called ‘non-standard analysis’, every infinitesimal
has a reciprocal, so that there are different infinite numbers corresponding to
the different infinitesimals. There were attempts in the 1970s to apply this
idea to quantum field theory: in particular, it was shown how the different
orders of ultra-violet divergences correspond to different types of infinite
number in the sense of non-standard analysis [11].
In the second approach, there are infinitesimals but without the corre-
sponding infinite numbers. This is possible provided we work within the
context of a topos rather than normal set theory: for example, a careful
study of the proof that the only real number d such that d2 = 0 is 0, shows
that it involves the principle of excluded middle, which in general does not
hold in the intuitionistic logic of a topos [12].
This approach is known as ‘synthetic differential geometry’ (SDG), and it
is intriguing to see if our familiar physical theories can be rewritten using this
structure. For example, Fearns has recently shown how some of the features
of standard quantum theory can be expressed in this way [13] (see also [14]).
Of even greater importance, however, is the possibility that there may be
regimes in physics, in particular involving quantum space-time structures,
where SDG is more appropriate than the standard approach.
One such possibility is suggested by the ‘History Projection Operator’
approach to consistent histories in which there are copies of the standard
canonical commutation relations at each moment of time. For example, for
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a particle moving in one dimension we have the history algebra [15]
[xt, xt′ ] = 0 (6)
[pt, pt′ ] = 0 (7)
[xt, pt′ ] = ih¯δ(t
′ − t) (8)
where the label t on the (Schro¨dinger picture) operators xˆt and pˆt refers to
the time at which propositions about the system are asserted—the time of
‘temporal logic’.
A major advance in the HPO formalism took place when time was intro-
duced by Savvidou in a completely new way [16] [17]. It was realised that it is
natural to consider time in a two-fold manner: the ‘time of being’—the time
at which events ‘happen’ (the time label t in Eqs. (6)–(8) can be regarded
as such), and the ‘time of becoming’—the time of dynamical change, repre-
sented by a time label s. This second time appears in the history analogue
xˆt(s) of the Heisenberg picture, which is defined as xˆt(s) := e
isHˆ/h¯xˆte
−isHˆ/h¯
where Hˆ :=
∫
dtHˆt is the history quantity that represents the time average of
the energy of the system. The notion of time evolution is now recovered for
the time-averaged physical quantities, for example xˆf (s) := e
isHˆ/h¯xˆfe
−isHˆ/h¯
where f(t) is a smearing function.
Associated with these two manifestations of the concept of time are two
types of time transformation: the ‘external’ translation xˆt(s) 7→ xˆt+t′(s); and
the ‘internal’ translation xˆt(s) 7→ xˆt(s+ s
′). The external time translation is
generated by the ‘Louiville’ operator [16] Vˆ :=
∫
dt pˆt
dxˆt
dt
whereas the internal
time translation is generated by the time-averaged energy operator Hˆ .
More importantly, it was shown in [16] that the generator of time trans-
lation in the HPO theory is the ‘action’ operator Sˆ defined as
Sˆ :=
∫
dt pˆt
dxˆt
dt
− Hˆ = Vˆ − Hˆ. (9)
Hence the action operator is the generator of both types of time translation:
xˆt(s) 7→ xˆt+t′(s + s
′). It is a striking result that in the HPO theory the
quantum analogue of the classical action functional is an actual operator in
the formalism, and is the generator of time translations.
In the context of SDG, it is the view of Savvidou (with which I agree) that
the infinitesimals of SDG are particularly well adapted to describe transfor-
mations in the external time-parameter.
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If true, this has significant implications for the construction of a history
theory of quantum gravity. In particular, in the context of general relativity,
Savvidou has shown that the analogue of the Liouville transformations is the
full space-time diffeomorphism group [18]. Thus the intriguing possibility
arises that, in a history version of general relativity, there may be a natural
role for SDG, and hence for topos theory, in implementing the actions of this
fundamental group.
4 Presheaves and Related Notions from Topos
Theory
From now on we shall concentrate on topos theory itself, culminating in a
particular application to standard quantum theory.
There are various approaches to the notion of a topos but the focus here
will be on one that emphasises the underlying logical structure. To keep
the discussion simple, we will not develop the full definition of a topos but
will concentrate on the role of a ‘subobject classifier’. This involves a gen-
eralization of the set-theoretic idea of a characteristic function, and has a
particularly interesting logical structure in the kind of topos to which the
discussion in Section 5 is confined: namely, a topos of presheaves [19] [20].
A topos is a type of category that behaves much like the category of sets
Set.6 In the category Set, the objects are sets and the arrows/morphisms
are ordinary functions between them (set-maps). In many other categories,
the objects are sets equipped with some type of additional structure, and
the arrows are functions that preserve this structure. An example is the
category of groups, where an object is a group, and an arrow f : G1 → G2 is
a group homomorphism from G1 to G2. However, a category need not have
‘structured sets’ as its objects. An example is given by any partially-ordered
6Recall that a category consists of a collection of objects and a collection of arrows (or
morphisms), with the following three properties: (1) Each arrow f is associated with a
pair of objects, known as its domain (dom f) and the codomain (cod f), and is written in
the form f : B → A where B = domf and A = codf ; (2) Given two arrows f : B → A and
g : C → B (so that the codomain of g is equal to the domain of f), there is a composite
arrow f ◦ g : C → A, and this composition of arrows obeys the associative law; and
(3) Each object A has an identity arrow, idA : A → A, with the properties that for all
f : B → A and all g : A→ C, idA ◦ f = f and g ◦ idA = g.
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set (‘poset’) P. It can be regarded as a category in which (i) the objects are
the elements of P; and (ii) if p, q ∈ P, an arrow from p to q is defined to exist
if, and only if, p ≤ q in the poset structure. Thus, in a poset regarded as a
category, there is at most one arrow between any pair of objects p, q ∈ P.
In any category, an object T is called a terminal (resp. initial) object if
for every object A there is exactly one arrow f : A → T (resp. f : T → A).
Any two terminal (resp. initial) objects are isomorphic7. So we can fix on one
such object and write ‘the’ terminal (resp. initial) object as 1 (resp. 0). An
arrow 1→ A is called a point , or global element , of A. For example, applying
these definitions to the category of sets, we see that (i) each singleton set is
a terminal object; (ii) the empty set ∅ is initial; and (iii) the points of A are
in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of A (in the usual sense of
the word ‘element’ of a set).
4.1 Toposes and Subobject Classifiers
We turn now to the very special kind of category called a ‘topos’, concen-
trating on the requirement that a topos contains a generalization of the
set-theoretic concept of a characteristic function.
Recall that for any set X , and any subset A ⊆ X , there is a characteristic
function χA : X → {0, 1}, with χA(x) = 1 or 0 according as x ∈ A or x /∈ A.
One can think of {0, 1} as truth-values, with χA classifying the various x ∈ X
in response to question “Is x an element of A?”. Furthermore, {0, 1} is itself
a set—i.e. an object in the category Set—and for each A,X with A ⊆ X ,
χA is an arrow from X to {0, 1}.
These concepts extend to a general category as follows.
1. A ‘subobject’ is the analogue of the set-theoretic idea of a subset. More
precisely, one generalizes the idea that a subset A of X has a preferred
injective (i.e., one-to-one) map A→ X sending x ∈ A to x ∈ X . The
categorial analogue of an injective map is called a ‘monic arrow’, and a
subobject of any object X in a category is defined to be a monic arrow
with codomain X .
2. Any topos is required to have an analogue, written Ω, of the set {0, 1}
of truth-values; in particular, Ω is an object in the topos. Furthermore,
7Two objects A and B in a category are said to be isomorphic if there exists arrows
f : A→ B and g : B → A such that f ◦ g = idB and g ◦ f = idA
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there is a one-to-one correspondence between subobjects of an object
X , and arrows from X to Ω.
3. In a topos, Ω acts as an object of generalized truth-values, just as
{0, 1} does in set-theory (though Ω typically has more than two global
elements). Moreover, Ω has a natural logical structure. More precisely,
Ω has the internal structure of a Heyting algebra object: the algebraic
structure appropriate for intuitionistic logic, mentioned in Section 3.1.1.
In addition, the collection of subobjects of any given objectX in a topos
is a complete Heyting algebra.
4.2 Toposes of Presheaves
In preparation for the application to quantum theory discussed in Section 5,
we turn now to the theory of presheaves8.
First recall that a ‘functor’ between a pair of categories C and D is a
arrow-preserving function from one category to the other. More precisely,
a covariant functor F from a category C to a category D is a function that
assigns (i) to each C-object A, a D-object F(A); and (ii) to each C-arrow
f : B → A, a D-arrow F(f) : F(B) → F(A) such that F(idA) = idF(A).
These assignments are such that if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
F(f ◦ g) = F(f) ◦ F(g).
A presheaf (or varying set) on the category C is defined to be a covariant
functor X from the category C to the category of sets. We want to make
the collection of presheaves on C into a category, and so it is necessary to
define what is meant by an ‘arrow’ between two presheaves X and Y. This
is defined to be a natural transformation N : X → Y, which is a family
of maps (the components of N) NA : X(A) → Y(A), where A an object
in C, such that if f : A → B is an arrow in C, then the composite map
X(A)
NA−→ Y(A)
Y(f)
−→ Y(B) is equal to X(A)
X(f)
−→ X(B)
NB−→ Y(B), as shown
8More precisely, the theory of presheaves on an arbitrary ‘small’ category C (the quali-
fication ‘small’ means that the collection of objects in C is a genuine set, as is the collection
of all arrows in C).
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in the commutative diagram
X(A)yNA
Y(A)
X(f)
−→
Y(f)
−→
X(B)yNB
Y(B)
(10)
An object K is said to be a subobject of X if there is an arrow in the
category of presheaves i : K → X with the property that, for each A, the
component map iA : K(A) → X(A) is a subset embedding, i.e., K(A) ⊆
X(A). Thus, if f : A → B is any arrow in C, we get the commutative
diagram
K(A)y
X(A)
K(f)
−→
X(f)
−→
K(B)y
X(B)
(11)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
The category of presheaves on C, SetC, forms a topos. We turn now to
discussing the subobject classifier of this particular topos.
4.2.1 Sieves and the Subobject Classifier in a Topos of Presheaves.
A key concept in presheaf theory—and something of particular importance
for the quantum theory application discussed later—is that of a ‘sieve’, which
plays a central role in the construction of the subobject classifier in the topos
SetC of presheaves on a category C.
A sieve on an object A in C is defined to be a collection S of arrows
f : A → B in C with the property that if f : A → B belongs to S, and if
g : B → C is any arrow, then g ◦ f : A→ C also belongs to S. In the simple
case where C is a poset, a sieve on p ∈ C is any subset S of C such that if
r ∈ S then (i) p ≤ r, and (ii) r′ ∈ S for all r ≤ r′. Thus a sieve is just an
upper set in the poset.
The presheaf Ω : C → Set is now defined as follows. If A is an object in
C, then Ω(A) is defined to be the set of all sieves on A; and if f : A → B,
then Ω(f) : Ω(A)→ Ω(B) is defined as
Ω(f)(S) := {h : B → C | h ◦ f ∈ S} (12)
for all S ∈ Ω(A). Note that if S is a sieve on A, and if f : A → B belongs
to S, then from the defining property of a sieve
Ω(f)(S) := {h : B → C | h ◦ f ∈ S} = {h : B → C} =: ↑B (13)
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where ↑B denotes the principal sieve on B, defined to be the set of all arrows
in C whose domain is B.
A crucial property of sieves is that the set Ω(A) of sieves on A has the
structure of a Heyting algebra where the unit element 1Ω(A) in Ω(A) is the
principal sieve ↑A, and the null element 0Ω(A) is the empty sieve ∅. The
partial ordering in Ω(A) is defined by S1 ≤ S2 if and only if S1 ⊆ S2; and
the logical connectives are defined as:
S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2 (14)
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2 (15)
S1 ⇒ S2 := {f : A→ B | ∀g : B → C if g ◦ f ∈ S1 then g ◦ f ∈ S2} .(16)
As in any Heyting algebra, the negation of an element S (called the pseudo-
complement of S) is defined as ¬S := S ⇒ 0; so that
¬S := {f : A→ B | for all g : B → C, g ◦ f 6∈ S}. (17)
As remarked earlier, the main distinction between a Heyting algebra and
a Boolean algebra is that, in the former, the negation operation does not
necessarily obey the law of excluded middle: instead, all that be can said is
that, for any element S,
S ∨ ¬S ≤ 1. (18)
It can be shown that the presheaf Ω is a subobject classifier for the topos
SetC. Thus subobjects of any object X in this topos (i.e., any presheaf on
C) are in one-to-one correspondence with arrows χ : X→ Ω. This works as
follows. LetK be a subobject ofX. Then there is an associated characteristic
arrow χK : X→ Ω, whose component χKA : X(A) → Ω(A) at each ‘stage of
truth’ A in C is defined as
χKA (x) := {f : A→ B | X(f)(x) ∈ K(B)} (19)
for all x ∈ X(A). That the right hand side of Eq. (19) actually is a sieve on
A follows from the defining properties of a subobject.9
9There is a converse to Eq. (19): namely, each arrow χ : X → Ω (i.e., a natural
transformation between the presheaves X and Ω) defines a subobject Kχ of X via
K
χ(A) := χ−1A {1Ω(A)}. (20)
at each stage of truth A.
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Thus, in each ‘branch’ of the category C going ‘upstream’ from the stage
A, χKA (x) picks out the first member B in that branch for which X(f)(x) lies
in the subset K(B), and the commutative diagram Eq. (11) then guarantees
that X(h ◦ f)(x) will lie in K(C) for all h : B → C.
Thus each ‘stage of truth’ A in C serves as a possible context for an
assignment to each x ∈ X(A) of a generalised truth-value, which is a sieve
belonging to the Heyting algebraΩ(A). This is the sense in which contextual,
generalised truth-values arise naturally in a topos of presheaves.
4.2.2 Global Sections of a Presheaf
For the category of presheaves on C, a terminal object 1 : C → Set can be
defined by 1(A) := {∗} (a singleton set) at all stages A in C; if f : A→ B is
an arrow in C then 1(f) : {∗} → {∗} is defined to be the map ∗ 7→ ∗. This
is indeed a terminal object since, for any presheaf X, we can define a unique
natural transformation N : X→ 1 whose components NA : X(A)→ 1(A) =
{∗} are the constant maps x 7→ ∗ for all x ∈ X(A).
A global element (or point) of a presheaf X is also called a global section.
As an arrow γ : 1 → X in the topos SetC, a global section corresponds to a
choice of an element γA ∈ X(A) for each stage of truth A in C, such that, if
f : A→ B, the ‘matching condition’
X(f)(γA) = γB (21)
is satisfied. As we shall see, the Kochen-Specher theorem can be read as
asserting the non-existence of any global sections of certain presheaves that
arises naturally in quantum theory.
5 Presheaves of Propositions, and Valuations
in Quantum Theory
The contextual, multi-valued logic that arises naturally in a topos of presheaves
has some very interesting potential applications in theoretical physics. Here,
however, I shall briefly present just one particular example that has been
developed in detail elsewhere [21, 22, 23]. This is the proposal to retain a
‘realist flavour’ in the assignment of values to quantum-theoretic quantities
by using the non-Boolean logical structure of a particular topos of presheaves.
20
Before stating the proposal precisely, recall the Kochen-Specher theorem
which asserts the impossibility of associating real values V (Aˆ) to all physical
quantities in a quantum theory (if dimH > 2) whilst preserving the ‘FUNC ’
rule that V (f(Aˆ) = f(V (Aˆ))—i.e., the value of a function f of a physical
quantity A is equal to the function of the value of the quantity. Equivalently,
it is not possible to assign true-false values to all the propositions in a quan-
tum theory in a way that respects the structure of the associated lattice of
projection operators. As we shall see, our topos-theoretic proposal is such
that the truth value ascribed to a proposition about the value of a physical
quantity need not be just ‘true’ or ‘false’.
Thus consider the proposition “A ∈ ∆”, which asserts that the value of
the quantity A lies in a Borel set ∆ ⊆ IR. Roughly speaking, our proposal
is that any such proposition should be ascribed as a truth-value a set of
coarse-grainings, f(Aˆ), of the operator Aˆ that represents A. Exactly which
coarse-grainings are in the truth-value depends in a precise way on ∆ and the
quantum state ψ: specifically, f(Aˆ) is in the truth-value if and only if ψ is in
the range of the spectral projector Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. Note the contrast with
the conventional eigenstate-eigenvalue link: our requirement is not that ψ be
in the range of Eˆ[A ∈ ∆], but a weaker one since, generally, Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]
is a larger spectral projector than Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]; i.e., in the lattice L(H)
of projectors on the Hilbert space H, we have Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)].
So the intuitive idea is that the new proposed truth-value of “A ∈ ∆” is
given by the set of weaker propositions “f(A) ∈ f(∆)” that are true in the
old (i.e., eigenstate-eigenvalue link) sense. More precisely, the truth-value of
“A ∈ ∆” is the set of quantities f(A) for which the corresponding weaker
proposition “f(A) ∈ f(∆)” is true in the old sense. Thus the truth-value of
a proposition in the new sense is given by the set of its consequences that
are true in the old sense.
The first step in stating the proposal precisely is to introduce the set O
of all bounded self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert space H of a quantum
system. The set O is turned into a category by defining the objects to be
the elements of O, and saying that there is an arrow from Aˆ to Bˆ if there
exists a real-valued function f on the spectrum σ(Aˆ) ⊂ IR of Aˆ, such that
Bˆ = f(Aˆ). If Bˆ = f(Aˆ), for some f : σ(Aˆ) → IR, then the corresponding
arrow in the category O will be denoted fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ.
The next step is define two presheaves on the category O, called the dual
presheaf and the coarse-graining presheaf respectively. The former affords an
21
elegant formulation of the Kochen-Specker theorem, namely as the statement
that the dual presheaf does not have global sections. The latter is at the basis
of the proposed generalised truth-value assignments.
The dual presheaf on O is the covariant functor D : O → Set defined as
follows:
1. On objects: D(Aˆ) is the dual of WA, where WA is the spectral algebra
of the operator Aˆ (i.e. WA is the collection of all projectors onto the
subspaces of H associated with Borel subsets of σ(Aˆ)). Thus D(Aˆ) is
defined to be the set of all homomorphisms from the Boolean algebra
WA to the Boolean algebra {0, 1}.
2. On arrows: If fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then D(fO) : D(WA)→
D(WB) is defined by D(fO)(χ) := χ|Wf(A) where χ|Wf(A) is the restric-
tion of χ ∈ D(WA) to the subalgebra Wf(A) ⊆WA.
A global element (global section) of the functor D : O → Set is then a
function γ that associates to each Aˆ ∈ O an element γA of the dual of WA
such that if fO : Aˆ → Bˆ (so Bˆ = f(Aˆ) and WB ⊆ WA), then γA|WB = γB.
Thus, for all projectors αˆ ∈ WB ⊆WA, we have γB(αˆ) = γA(αˆ).
Since each αˆ in the lattice L(H) of projection operators onH belongs to at
least one such spectral algebra WA (for example, the algebra {0ˆ, 1ˆ, αˆ, 1ˆ− αˆ})
it follows that a global section of D associates to each projection operator
αˆ ∈ L(H) a number V (αˆ) which is either 0 or 1, and is such that if αˆ and βˆ
are disjoint propositions then V (αˆ ∨ βˆ) = V (αˆ) + V (βˆ). A global section γ
of the presheaf D would correspond to an assignment of truth-values {0, 1}
to all propositions of the form “A ∈ ∆”, which obeyed the FUNC condition
γA|WB = γB. But these are precisely the types of valuation prohibited by the
Kochen-Specker theorem provided that dimH > 2! So an alternative way of
expressing the Kochen-Specker theorem is the statement that (if dimH > 2)
the dual presheaf D has no global sections.
However, we can use the subobject classifier Ω in the topos SetO of
all presheaves on O to assign generalized truth-values to the propositions
“A ∈ ∆”. These truth-values will be sieves—as defined in Section 4.2.1—
and since they will be assigned relative to each ‘context’ or ‘stage of truth’
Aˆ in O, these truth-values will be contextual as well as generalized. Note
that because in any topos the subobject classifier Ω is unique up to isomor-
phism the traditional objection to multi-valued logics in quantum theory—
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that their structure often seems arbitrary—does not apply to these particular
generalized, contextual truth-values.
The first step is to define the appropriate presheaf of propositions. The
coarse-graining presheaf over O is the covariant functorG : O → Set defined
as follows.
1. On objects in O: G(Aˆ) := WA, the spectral algebra of Aˆ.
2. On arrows in O: If fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ (i.e., Bˆ = f(Aˆ)), then G(fO) : WA →
WB is defined as
10
G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] (22)
A function ν that assigns to each object Aˆ in O and each Borel set
∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ), a sieve of arrows in O on Aˆ (i.e., a sieve of arrows with Aˆ as
domain), will be called a sieve-valued valuation on G. We write the values
of this function as ν(A ∈ ∆).
From the logical point of view, a natural requirement for any kind of
valuation on a presheaf of propositions such asG is that the valuation should
specify a subobject ofG. But subobjects are in one-one correspondence with
arrows, i.e., natural transformations, N : G→ Ω. So it is natural to require
a sieve-valued valuation ν to define such a natural transformation by the
equation NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := ν(A ∈ ∆) for all stages/contexts Aˆ.
This requirement leads directly to the analogue for presheaves of the func-
tional composition condition of the Kochen-Specker theorem, called FUNC
above. Indeed, it transpires that a sieve-valued valuation defines a natural
transformation if and only if it obeys (the presheaf version of) FUNC .
To spell this out, first recall that sieves are ‘pushed forward’ by the sub-
object classifier Ω according to Eq. (12). For the category O: if fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ,
then Ω(fO) : Ω(Aˆ)→ Ω(Bˆ) is defined by
Ω(fO)(S) := {hO : B → C | hO ◦ fO ∈ S} (23)
for all sieves S ∈ Ω(Aˆ).
10If f(∆) is not Borel, the right hand side is to be understood in the sense of Theorem
4.1 of [21]—a measure-theoretic nicety that we shall not discuss here.
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Accordingly, we say that a sieve-valued valuation ν on G satisfies gen-
eralized functional composition—for short, FUNC—if for all Aˆ, Bˆ and fO :
Aˆ→ Bˆ and all Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ∈ G(Aˆ), we have
ν(B ∈ G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])) ≡ ν(f(A) ∈ f(∆)) = Ω(fO)(ν(A ∈ ∆)). (24)
It can readily be checked that FUNC is exactly the condition a sieve-
valued valuation must obey in order to define a natural transformation—i.e.,
a subobject of G—by the equation NνA(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := ν(A ∈ ∆). That is, a
sieve-valued valuation ν on G obeys FUNC if and only if the functions at
each context Aˆ
Nν
Aˆ
(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := ν(A ∈ ∆) (25)
define a natural transformation Nν from G to Ω.
It turns out that with any quantum state there is associated such a sieve-
valued valuation obeying FUNC . Furthermore, this valuation gives the nat-
ural generalization of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link described earlier. That
is, a quantum state ψ induces a sieve on each Aˆ in O by the requirement
that an arrow fO : Aˆ → Bˆ is in the sieve if and only if ψ is in the range of
the spectral projector Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]. To be precise, we define for any ψ, and
any Borel subset ∆ of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ,
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ}
= {fO : Aˆ→ Bˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) = 1} (26)
where Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) is the usual Born-rule probability that the result
of a measurement of B will lie in f(∆), given the state ψ.
One can check that the definition satisfies FUNC , and also has other
properties that it is natural to require of a valuation (discussed in [21, 22, 23]).
Thus, by using topos theory we are able to assign generalised truth values
to all propositions whilst preserving the appropriate analogue of the FUNC
condition.
The key feature of these truth assignments is that they involve the contex-
tual, multi-valued logic that is an intrinsic feature of a topos of presheaves.
My expectation is that a similar topos structure could serve to patch together
the different types of quantum theory that, as discussed earlier, I anticipate
should be associated with different background space-time structures.
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6 Conclusions
In general, the real numbers enter physical theories in three ways: as the
values of physical quantities; as coordinates on a manifold model for space
and time; and as the values of probabilities. The main thrust of the present
paper is to argue that all three uses may become problematic in physical
regimes that characterise strong quantum gravity effects.
In particular, I have argued that the assignment of real numbers as val-
ues of physical quantities and probabilities is to some extent motivated by
certain a priori ideas about the continuum nature of space and time. Thus
it may be fundamentally wrong to attempt to construct a quantum theory of
gravity whilst using a quantum formalism in which these a priori continuum
ideas are present from the beginning. My contention is that there should be
a different type of quantum structure for each ‘type’ of background space-
time: in particular, the mathematical spaces in which physical quantities and
probabilities take their values should reflect the structure of this background.
If this is correct, the question then arises as to how to patch together
a collection of such theories in the situation where the ‘background’ space-
times are themselves the subject of quantum effects. I have suggested that
the appropriate mathematical tool for doing this is topos theory; in particular
the theory of presheaves with its intrinsic contextual, multi-valued logic. As
an example of the use of this theory I have briefly reviewed an application of
presheaf theory to the Kocken-Specher theorem in standard quantum theory.
Topos theory is also an essential ingredient in synthetic differential ge-
ometry, and this too may have important applications in theoretical physics;
particularly perhaps in the context of the two-pronged way in which time
arises in the consistent history theory.
What is sketched in the first half of this paper is only a collection of
ideas. It remains an outstanding challenge to implement some of these gen-
eral thoughts in the context, say, of a specific non-standard spatio-temporal
background, such as a causal set. This could give valuable insight into what
is perhaps the hardest task of all: to construct a quantum formalism for
use in situations where there are no prima facie spatio-temporal concepts at
all—a situation that could well arise in a quantum gravity theory in which
all of what we might want to call “spatio-temporal concepts” emerge from
the basic formalism only in some limiting sense.
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